MESTRES PENSADORES

1. Sovereign Immunity and Non-Interference in Domestic Judicial Affairs

Under U.S. and international legal principles, the actions of Alexandre de Moraes, as a sitting justice of Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF), fall within the scope of Brazil’s sovereign judicial authority. The U.S. legal system recognizes the doctrine of sovereign immunity, rooted in cases such as Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon (1812), which limits interference in the legitimate functions of foreign governments. Moraes’s judicial decisions—whether related to investigations of disinformation, electoral integrity, or public security—represent Brazil’s exercise of its domestic jurisdiction.

Applying the Magnitsky Act, a U.S. statute (Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, 2016), to a foreign judge for actions taken within his official capacity risks violating this principle. The Act targets individuals for “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” or significant corruption, yet the evidence presented by McCormick and Salazar—primarily political disagreement with Moraes’s rulings—does not meet this threshold. U.S. jurists, such as Professor Harold Koh of Yale Law School, have emphasized that sanctions like Magnitsky should be reserved for clear, egregious abuses (e.g., extrajudicial killings, torture), not judicial rulings subject to political dispute.

2. Insufficient Evidence of "Gross Human Rights Violations"

The Magnitsky Act requires credible, specific evidence of human rights abuses. Critics, including McCormick and Salazar, allege Moraes’s actions (e.g., censorship orders, investigations of Bolsonaro supporters) constitute “tyranny judicial” and “abuses of rights.” However, these claims lack substantiation under U.S. legal standards. For instance, in United States v. Noriega (1990), U.S. courts required concrete evidence of violations beyond political rhetoric. Moraes’s orders—such as suspending social media accounts or probing disinformation—stem from Brazilian legal frameworks (e.g., the 1988 Constitution, Electoral Code) aimed at protecting democratic institutions, not dismantling them.

Posts on X and web articles suggest Moraes targets “Bolsonarism” (a political movement tied to former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro), but U.S. law does not recognize political censorship as a standalone basis for Magnitsky sanctions absent torture, arbitrary detention, or similar acts. Legal scholar Eric Posner has argued that Magnitsky’s scope should not extend to “politically motivated overreach” without documented atrocities, a standard unmet here.

3. Protection of Democratic Institutions as a Legitimate Judicial Role

Moraes’s actions must be contextualized within Brazil’s democratic framework. As a Supreme Court justice, he oversees cases involving electoral integrity and public safety—areas where disinformation campaigns, like those probed in Brazil’s 2022 elections, threaten stability. U.S. courts have upheld analogous measures; in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the Supreme Court affirmed that regulating political processes to safeguard democracy is a legitimate state interest. Moraes’s investigations into Bolsonaro-aligned figures mirror this principle, countering claims of “anti-democratic” intent.

American jurists like Laurence Tribe have noted that judicial intervention to curb disinformation aligns with democratic norms, especially when tied to national security. Brazil’s STF has stated Moraes lacks U.S. assets, undermining claims of corruption or sanctionable conduct under Magnitsky’s economic prongs.

4. Politicization of the Magnitsky Act Undermines Its Integrity

Applying Magnitsky to Moraes risks politicizing a tool meant for human rights accountability. Brazilian scholars, echoed by U.S. observers like Rodrigo Amaral of PUC-SP (quoted in web sources), argue that sanctioning Moraes would be a “politization” to “embarrass” him, not a principled stand. U.S. Senator Ben Cardin, a key Magnitsky advocate, has warned against its misuse for settling political scores, as seen in legislative debates (e.g., 2016 Senate records). Targeting Moraes—without evidence of personal enrichment or violence—aligns more with partisan support for Bolsonaro than Magnitsky’s original intent (punishing Russian officials for Sergei Magnitsky’s death).

5. Countering Bolsonarism’s Threat to U.S. Interests

McCormick and Salazar frame Moraes as a “threat to U.S. interests,” citing his alleged censorship of American companies (e.g., X). Yet, Bolsonarism’s spread in North America—via disinformation networks tied to events like the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot—poses a clearer risk. U.S. intelligence and legal experts, per the 2022 Senate Intelligence Committee reports, have linked Bolsonaro-style rhetoric to far-right extremism domestically. Moraes’s efforts to curb this ideology’s online amplification protect, rather than undermine, mutual U.S.-Brazil democratic interests.

6. Practical and Legal Limits of U.S. Jurisdiction

Even if sanctions were pursued, their impact would be negligible. The STF has confirmed Moraes holds no U.S. assets, and visa bans lack enforcement teeth against a foreign judge unlikely to travel recreationally to the U.S. In Zschernig v. Miller (1968), the Supreme Court cautioned against state actions that unduly interfere in foreign affairs—here, sanctioning Moraes could strain U.S.-Brazil relations without clear gain, a view supported by State Department norms favoring diplomacy over unilateralism.

Conclusion

Alexandre de Moraes’s judicial acts do not meet the Magnitsky Act’s criteria for sanctions. His role in Brazil’s democracy, while controversial to Bolsonaro supporters, aligns with sovereign judicial duties, not human rights abuses. U.S. law and jurists demand rigorous evidence and restraint in extraterritorial measures—standards unmet by McCormick and Salazar’s politically charged request. Far from threatening U.S. interests, Moraes’s containment of Bolsonarism’s destabilizing influence serves a shared democratic purpose. Sanctions would thus be an unwarranted, ineffective overreach.